Abstract: Code-based cryptosystems are promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography since they are fast, require only basic arithmetic because their security is well understood. The increasing number of cryptographic schemes based on codes over fields other than F2 presents, however, security issues that are not relevant in the case of binary codes; the security of such constructions, therefore, requires separate assessment. Information set decoding (ISD) is one of the most important generic attacks against code-based cryptosystems. We give lower bounds for ISD over Fq, thereby anticipating future software and Copyright c 2017 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Introduction
In Shor (1994) showed that quantum computers can break most 'classical' cryptosystems, e.g. those based on the integer factorisation problem or on the discrete logarithm problem. It is, therefore, crucial to develop cryptosystems that are resistant to quantum computer attacks. Cryptography based on error-correcting codes is a very promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography since code-based cryptographic schemes are usually fast and do not require special hardware, specifically no cryptographic co-processor.
Error-correcting codes have been applied in cryptography for at least three decades, ever since McEliece published his paper in McEliece (1978) . The McEliece scheme is as old as RSA and has resisted cryptanalysis to date (except for a parameter adjustment). His work has received much attention as it is a promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography. McEliece used the class of binary Goppa codes for his construction, and most other schemes published since then have also been using binary codes.
However, in recent years, many new proposals use codes over larger fields F q , mostly in an attempt to reduce the size of the public and private keys. Two examples that received a lot of attention are quasi-cyclic (QC) Berger et al. (2009) , and quasi-dyadic (QD) Misoczki and Barreto (2009); Persichetti (2012) codes. The security of these codebased constructions, however, is not as well understood for q-ary codes as for binary ones. For instance, several attacks on QC and QD codes have been published, indicating how to break some of the proposed non-binary parameter sets , , Umana and Leander (2009) . Binary codes seem to be unaffected by these attacks.
The two most important types of attacks against code-based cryptosystems are structural attacks and decoding attacks. Structural attacks exploit structural weaknesses in the construction, and they attempt to recover the private key. For example, uses the QC structure of the matrix to decrease the number of variables in the linear equation system used to recover the secret key. Decoding attacks are used to decrypt a given ciphertext. In this paper, we will focus on a particular type of decoding attacks, based on so-called information set decoding (ISD) . Attacks based on ISD are among the most important generic decoding attacks, and they are the most efficient against several encryption and identification schemes.
To analyse the security of code-based schemes, cryptanalysts develop and improve (generic as well as specific) attacks, and propose lower bounds for the complexity of such attacks. All of these developments, however, assume that an attacker has no knowledge about the private key.
Partial knowledge
In some scenarios, an attacker can obtain partial knowledge of the private information and exploit this to improve the efficiency of an attack. Examples are:
1 Schemes that use a restricted error vector domain: Some cryptographic schemes, e.g. NTRU Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman (1998) , restrict the domain of an error vector. In this example, while the scheme itself is defined 1 over F q for q = 128 or q = 256, the error vector e is ternary, i.e. e ∈ {0, 1, −1} n . ISD algorithms can be used to attack such systems, and we will show how to exploit the knowledge about the error vector domain. We analyse this example in more detail in Section 4.4.
2 Schemes that leak information about the error vector entries: In Stern's identification (ID) scheme Stern (1993) , the prover sends a random permutation of the private vector to the verifier. This reveals the non-zero values of the vector, while their positions remain secret.This information is useless when binary codes are used (as in the original scheme), it does give the attacker an advantage when codes over F q are used like in Cayrel, Véron and El Yousfi Alaoui (2010) . We will analyse this example in more detail in Section 4.3.
Previous work
Many improvements and generalisations of ISD-like attacks have already been proposed in the literature; amongst these, we outline these pivotal examples:
1962 Prange (1962) : The first proposal to use information sets for decoding Leon (1988 : Prange's proposal is made probabilistic, thereby improving its runtime 1988 Lee and Brickell (1988) : Introduced a systematic way to determine whether the recovered message is correct and proposed several other improvements. These include bitwise computation of vectors, which stops the computation earlier, and a speedup of the Gaussian elimination which reuses part of the columns of the parity-check matrix.
1990 van Tilburg (1988) : The efficiency of the algorithm is further improved, and the ISD attack is made more efficient by a systematic method of checking and by using a random bit swapping procedure.
1989 Stern (1989) : Proposed an idea that allows to make use of the birthday paradox, thereby increasing the speed of the search step.
1998 Canteaut and Chabaud (1998) 2012 Becker et al. (2012) : The previous variant is further refined thanks to two additional conditions, leading again to a small gain.
2015 May and Ozerov (2015) : The authors adapted the algorithm in High-Dimensional Nearest Neighbor Har-Peled, Indyk and Motwani (2012), Andoni et al. (2014) , Dubiner (2010) .
Our work stems from two papers -by Sendrier (2009) and . The former provides lower bounds for the complexity of the ISD algorithm over F 2 , the latter describes how to generalise Stern's and Lee-Brickell's algorithms to F q . We are not aware of any previous work that specifically deals with the effects of partial knowledge.
Our contribution
In this paper, we propose and prove lower bounds for the complexity of ISD algorithms over a finite field F q . We generalise the lower bounds proposed by Finiasz and Sendrier (2009) to codes over F q and fix a misapproximation in their proof (the approximation of the parameter l is suboptimal). In Bernstein, Lange and Peters (2010) , the authors pointed out that the lower bound cannot be correct by showing how to decrease the algorithm complexity below the corresponding lower bound. We also use a more general attack algorithm to derive the lower bound that takes the improvement in Bernstein, Lange and Peters (2010) into account. This improvement is based on the fact that vectors with a single non-zero entry can be added using less operations than the addition of random vectors. While the authors of Bernstein, Lange and Peters (2010) also propose a new bound for the complexity of (binary) ISD, this bound is looser than ours. For the parameter set (12, 200, 9, 244, 488) mentioned in the paper, their bound yields approx. 890 bits of security, compared with 991 bits for our lower bound. In addition to that, we show how to use the structure of F q to increase the algorithm efficiency and compare our lower bounds with the ISD algorithm described by . The details of the proof are given in Appendix A.
Based on this generalisation, we analyse two types of partial knowledge an attacker can obtain in certain scenarios. We show that additional knowledge can be used to improve the efficiency of an attack by restricting the space that needs to be searched, and we prove new lower bounds for these cases. As a first example, we analyse the Cayrel-Véron-El Yousfi (CVE) ID scheme Cayrel, Véron and El Yousfi Alaoui (2010) to apply our methodology and assess their method to prevent the information leak. A second example shows how to attack the NTRU scheme using our modified ISD algorithm.
This work is an extension of two conference papers: the generalisation of ISD to F q was presented in Niebuhr et al. (2010b) (without formal proceedings), and the impact of partial knowledge was analysed in Niebuhr et al. (2010a) .
2 The additional contribution of this merged version is to provide a self-contained paper that includes all necessary proofs. The new section on CVE provides a better example on possible information leaks and how to prevent them. Also, this merged version allows to view both works in context, since the two parts are strongly linked to one another.
Organisation of the paper
In Section 2, we start with an overview of coding theory and code-based cryptography over F q . The subsequent Section 3 presents the idealised ISD algorithm we are analysing and states the lower bound result. We apply these lower bounds to concrete parameters and compare the results with the most recent algorithm. Section 4 covers the analysis of the mentioned types of partial knowledge. In the following, we apply our results to the example of the CVE ID scheme and to NTRU. We conclude in Section 5.
Overview of code-based cryptography

Coding theory over F q
A linear code C is a k-dimensional subspace of an n-dimensional vector space over a finite field F q . The code parameters k and n are positive integers with k ≤ n, q is a prime power, and a code with these parameters is denoted [n, k]-code.
Definition 1 (Hamming weight): The (Hamming) weight wt(x) of a vector x is the number of its non-zero entries.
Definition 2 (Minimum distance): The (Hamming) distance d(x, y) between two vectors x, y ∈ F n q is defined as the (Hamming) weight of x − y. The minimum weight d of a code C is defined as the minimum distance between any two different codewords, or equivalently as the minimum weight over all non-zero codewords:
wt(c).
A linear code of length n, dimension k, and minimum distance
The error-correcting capability of such a code equals ⌊(d − 1)/2⌋ (under boundeddistance decoding). By (n, k, t), we denote a code that can efficiently decode up to t ≤ ⌊(d − 1)/2⌋ errors. The co-dimension r of this code is defined as r := n − k.
Definition 3 (Generator and parity check matrix): Let C be a linear code over F q . A generator matrix G of C is a matrix whose rows form a basis of C:
A parity check matrix H of C is defined by the characterising property
and it generates the dual space of C. For a given parity check matrix H and any vector e, we call s the syndrome of e where s T := He T .
Remark 1: Generator and parity check matrices are always of full rank. Two generator matrices generate equivalent codes if one is obtained from the other by a linear transformation or permutation of columns. Therefore, we can write any generator matrix G in systematic form G = [I k |R], where I k is the identity matrix of size k and | denotes concatenation. This allows a more compact representation of the matrix. If C is generated by G = [I k |R], then a parity check matrix for C is H = [−R T |I n−k ] (up to permutation, H can be transformed, so that the identity submatrix is on the left-hand side).
For any generator matrix G and parity check matrix H of a code, we have GH T = 0.
Remark 2: For an [n, k, d]-code, the generator matrix G is of size k × n, and the parity check matrix has size (n − k) × n = r × n.
The Gilbert-Varshamov (GV) bound provides a bound on the maximum size of a code and states the existence of codes with certain parameters.
Theorem 1 (q-ary Gilbert-Varshamov bound): Let A q (n, d) be the maximum size (maximum number of codewords) of a q-ary code of length n and minimum distance d. Then:
Let n, k and d 0 be positive integers such that
Proof: See Varshamov (1957) .
Remark 3:
Since for large n, the last term dominates the sum, the bound is often approximated by
Random codes, which are used in the Stern ID scheme and the CVE ID scheme below, satisfy the GV bound with equality.
The syndrome decoding problem and the McEliece PKC
Problem 1: Given an (n − k) × n full-rank matrix H and a vector s, both with entries in F q , and a non-negative integer t; find a vector e ∈ F n q of weight t such that He T = s T .
The corresponding decision problem was proved to be NP-complete in Berlekamp, McEliece and van Tilborg (1978) , but only for binary codes. In 1994, A. Barg proved that this result holds for codes over all finite fields [ (Barg, 1994, in Russian) and (Barg, 1997, Theorem 4.1) ]. Many code-based cryptographic constructions are based on the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem. Among those are the McEliece encryption scheme McEliece (1978) and the CFS signature scheme Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier (2001) . The latter, however, is unsuitable for q-ary codes, since it requires codes with high density of decodable words, and the density rapidly decreases with an increasing field size q. We will, therefore, briefly describe the McEliece encryption scheme and show how it can be attacked by solving the syndrome decoding problem.
The McEliece PKC
The McEliece public-key encryption scheme was presented by McEliece (1978) . The original scheme uses binary Goppa codes, for which it remains unbroken, but the scheme can be used with any class of codes for which an efficient decoding algorithm is known.
Let G ′ be a generator matrix for a linear (n, k, t)-code over F q , and D G ′ be a corresponding efficient decoding algorithm that can correct up to t errors. Let P be a random n × n permutation matrix and S an invertible k × k matrix over F q . These form the private key, while (G, t) is made public, where G := SG ′ P .
Encryption: Represent the plaintext as a vector m of length k over F q , choose a q-ary random error vector e of weight t, and compute the ciphertext c = mG + e.
Decryption:
Compute
As P is a permutation matrix, eP −1 has the same weight as e. Therefore, D G ′ can be used to decode these errors:
Thus, we can compute the plaintext m =mS −1 .
Remark 4:
In the McEliece cryptosystem using an [n, k, d] code, the number of error vectors is n t (q − 1) t , while the number of possible syndromes is q r . Therefore, if
there is at most one solution to the SD problem, so the decoding process is unique. Otherwise, there can be several solutions.
The birthday paradox
The algorithms in this paper make use of the famous birthday paradox. The name is due to the fact that a surprisingly small number of people are required such that the probability of at least two of them having the same birthday is greater than 50% (this number is 23).
In our context, the birthday paradox is used in the following way. In order to find p columns of a matrix H that sum up to a given vector s, we build two lists. L 1 contains sums of p/2 columns of H, and L 2 = {s − x : x ∈ L 1 }. Finding a common entry between these lists corresponds to the birthday situation, hence we can expect to quickly find a large number of these (so-called) collisions.
Information set decoding
Information set decoding algorithms are among the most efficient generic attacks against code-based cryptosystems like the McEliece encryption scheme, the CFS signature scheme Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier (2001) , the stands for Fast Syndrome-Based (FSB) hash function Augot, Finiasz and Sendrier (2005) , and others. Over the years, there have been many improvements and generalisations of ISD-like attacks.
ISD algorithms solve the decoding problem, i.e. the decoding code words with errors. More specifically, if m is a plaintext and c = mG + e is a ciphertext, where e is a vector of weight t, then ISD algorithms take c as input and recover m (or, equivalently, e). Since s T := Hc T = H(mG + e) T = He T , the problem is often formulated using a parity check matrix as in Problem 1.
If the number of errors that have to be corrected is smaller than the GV bound, then there is at most one solution. Otherwise, there can be several solutions.
A basic version of an ISD algorithm works as follows: a random permutation P is applied to H in the hope that all columns corresponding to error positions in e are moved to the left-hand side of the matrix (in the first n − k columns). Then Gaussian elimination is used to transform H into the form
, where I n−k is the (n − k) × (n − k) identity matrix, and the row operations are performed on s as well to get s ′ . If s ′ has a weight not exceeding t, the algorithm succeeds; we can read off the error positions from s ′ and get
, where 0 k is the zero vector of size k. Otherwise, the algorithm restarts.
Most advanced ISD versions use of the birthday paradox: they allow a certain (usually small) number p of errors in the last k − l columns of H. Then lists of column sums of H are used to find these error positions. If we split the right-hand part of
T , and write e = [e 1 |e 2 ], then we search for a vector e 2 of weight p such that s T − H 2 e T 2 has weight t − p, and the non-zero positions of s T − H 2 e T 2 show the remaining t − p error positions.
This idea is further refined in some papers, such as Bernstein, Lange and Peters (2011) , where the weight distribution is characterised by an additional parameter q.
The next section describes the algorithm which is used for our analysis in more detail.
Lower bounds for information set decoding over F q
The security analysis of cryptosystems considers the most efficient known algorithm breaking the security of a cryptographic scheme and then it estimates the attack's complexity. However, when a faster attack is developed, this security analysis might become obsolete. Over the years, there have been many improvements for ISD. The authors of Finiasz and Sendrier (2009) proposed to establish lower bounds for an ISD family of algorithms to allow for conservative, longer lasting security estimates. Our algorithm is a generalisation of Finiasz and Sendrier (2009) to code over F q . This algorithm represents an idealised ISD-like algorithm, meaning that we only consider a cost for the most crucial steps and assume no cost for overhead, memory access etc. The most significant steps in ISD are the calculation of syndromes (ISD 1 and ISD 2 in Algorithm 1 on page 58) and checking the success condition (ISD 3). We first describe how to modify the ISD algorithm to work over F q ; then we show how to use the field structure to increase efficiency by a factor of √ q − 1.
Analysis of the algorithm
The algorithm we describe here recovers a q-ary error vector. In each step, we randomly rearrange the columns of the parity check matrix H and transform it into the form
where I n−k−l and I l are identity matrices of size (n − k − l) and size l, respectively. The columns are usually chosen adaptively to guarantee the success of this step, i.e., to ensure that n − k linearly independent columns are found. Although this approach could bias the following steps, it has not shown any influence in practice. The variables l and p (see next step) are algorithm parameters optimised for each parameter set (n, k, t).
The error vector we are looking for has p 1 errors in the column set corresponding to H 1 and H 2 , p 2 errors in the columns corresponding to I l , and the remaining (t − p 1 − p 2 ) errors in the first (n − k − l) columns. The reason for this split into p 1 and p 2 errors is that columns in the middle block of H only have one non-zero entry, which makes it faster to add them to another vector. We will go into more detail at the end of this section.
To find an error vector with the structure described above, many possible error patterns of p := p 1 + p 2 errors in the last k + l columns are checked, such that the weighted sum s of those p columns is identical to the syndrome s in the last l entries. This is done by searching for collisions between two sets L 1 and L 2 defined as
whereĤ 2 = [I l |H 2 ], W 1 ⊆ W k+l;⌊p/2⌋;q and W 2 ⊆ W k+l;⌈p/2⌉;q are given to the algorithm, and W k+l;p;q is the set of all q-ary words of length k + l and weight p such that the first l entries contain exactly p 2 errors. This approach corresponds to the overlapping sets technique proposed in Finiasz and Sendrier (2009) . Alternatively, the sets can be defined such that they overlap only partially or not at all, but this has only a small influence in practice. Writing e = [e ′ |(e 1 + e 2 )] and s = [s 1 |s 2 ] with s 2 of length l, we now search for vectors e 1 and e 2 of weight ⌊p/2⌋ and ⌈p/2⌉, respectively, such that
If this succeeds, we compute the differenceŝ − s; if this does not have weight t − p, the algorithm restarts. Otherwise, we writeĤ 1 = [0|H 1 ], and then the non-zero entries correspond to the remaining t − p errors:
Therefore, we have
revealing the remaining columns of e.
Definition 4: For any code parameters n, r, t and q, we denote by WF qISD (n, r, t, q) the minimum work factor (in number of operations) of Algorithm 1 applied to an (n, k = n − r, t)-code over F q , i.e., after optimising l, p 1 , p 2 , W 1 and W 2 for these parameters.
In the algorithm described in this paper, all computations are done over F q , so the complexity also depends on the implementation of q-ary arithmetic. A naïve implementation yields an additional factor of log 2 (q) for addition and log 2 2 (q) for multiplication. There are several techniques to improve this, e.g. by lifting to Z[x] (for large q) or by precomputing exp and log tables (for small q). Especially for small q, this allows to make q-ary arithmetic nearly as fast as binary, so in order to gain conservative estimates, we neglect this factor.
Using the field structure
We can use the field structure of F q to increase the algorithm's efficiency. While this improvement is one of our own contributions (and has been described in Niebuhr et al. (2010b) ), it has been found independently by Minder and Sinclair (2009) .
Note that, for all vectors e such that He T = s T , there are q − 1 pairwise different vectors e ′ such that He ′T = as T for some a ∈ F q \{0}, namely e ′ = ae. Clearly, if we find such an e ′ , we can calculate e and thus solve the syndrome decoding problem. We can modify the algorithm to allow it to find the vectors e ′ as well, thereby increasing the fraction of error vectors that are (implicitly) tested in each iteration by a factor of q − 1 (see Appendix A for a detailed description).
Since this fraction is calculated using |W 1 | · |W 2 |, we can also keep the fraction constant and decrease the size of the sets W i by a factor of √ q − 1 each. As the work factor in each iteration of the algorithm is linear in |W 1 | + |W 2 |, this increases the algorithm's efficiency by a factor √ q − 1. A simple way to decrease the size of the sets W i is to redefine them. For any vector a over F q , denote its leading element, i.e., its first non-zero entry, by le(a) ∈ F q \{0}, and let
Remark 5: Note that even though the calculation of each vector is more costly due to the final division by the leading coefficient, this is by far offset by the smaller number of vectors that must be computed.
The algorithm thus works as shown in Algorithm 1. The description is the one from Finiasz and Sendrier (2009), modified to include our improvement described above.
Algorithm 1 Information Set Decoding over F q Parameters:
• Code parameters: integers n, r = n − k and t, and a finite field F q .
• Algorithm parameters: two integers p > 0 and l > 0, and two sets W 1 ⊆ {e ∈ W k+l;⌊p/2⌋;q : le(e) = 1} and W 2 ⊆ W k+l;⌈p/2⌉;q .
Remark: The function h l (x) returns the last l bits of the vector x ∈ F Output: A pair (P, e), consisting of permutation P and vector e, which allow to compute the message m as described above.
//store e 1 in some data structure at index i for all
//extract the elements stored at index i for all e 1 ∈ S if wt(s 
where
, and
An exception is p = 0, which corresponds to the classical ISD algorithm proposed by Prange (1962) . In this case, we cannot gain a factor of √ q − 1, and the work factor is WF qISD (n, r, t, q) = n t r t .
If
t ≥ q r , the expected cost is
.
Proof:
We only sketch the proof here and give full details in Appendix A. By computing the number of syndromes that are tested in each iteration of the algorithm and the success probability of each error pattern we try, we can compute the expected number of iterations, which corresponds to the number of executions of the steps ISD 1 and ISD 2. While this number depends on the size of the sets W ′ 1 and W 2 , we can analytically find the optimal size for these sets. In addition to that, we compute the expected number of collisions we have to test per iteration (step ISD 3 in the algorithm). Multiplied by the number of iterations, this equals the number of executions of ISD 3. Finally, we use the number of operations required to execute ISD 1-3 to compute the total cost of the algorithm.
The variable K q represents the number of operations required to check condition ISD 3. A realistic value for K q is K q = 2t, which will be used for the parameters in Section 3.2. This value is justified by counting the computation of each row of (s T 2 −Ĥ 2 (e 1 + e 2 ) T ) as one operation; since every row has the same probability of yielding 0 or 1, step ISD 3 ends after 2t rows on average.
In Finiasz and Sendrier (2009) , the cost to compute the vectors in steps (ISD1) and (ISD2) was estimated to l operations. However, we can reduce the cost by optimising the calculation: by storing partial sums, we only have to add a single vector to compute the next syndrome. The number of operations required equals the weight of this vector, which is l/2 on average. In addition to that, we do a full, instead of a partial, Gaussian elimination, which corresponds to the central block I l of H. These vectors contain only a single nonzero entry, which makes it particularly fast to add them in order to compute the syndrome: for every partial sum of p 1 columns, we get l p2 syndromes at a very low cost. These facts were described in Bernstein, Lange and Peters (2010) .
The total work factor is the product of the number of iterations by the work factor per iteration. In practice, the latter is essentially the sum of a matrix multiplication (with the permutation matrix), the Gaussian elimination, and the search for collisions between L ′ 1 and L ′ 2 . Compared with the binary case, the Gaussian elimination is slower in the q-ary case, because every row has to be divided by the pivot entry. However, since matrix multiplication and Gaussian elimination are much faster than collision search, we allocate no cost to them.
Results
In Peters (2010), the author shows how to extend Lee-Brickell's and Stern's algorithms to code over F q . Website lists the work factor of this algorithm against several parameters. We use the same parameters and compare these results with our lower bound. For the algorithm from Peters (2010) as well as for our lower bound algorithm, the expected number of operations is the product of the number of iterations by the number of operations in each iteration. While the former factor is the same for both algorithms, or even a little higher for our algorithm, the lower bound for the number of operations per iteration is much smaller in our case, which results in the difference between these algorithms.
The following comparison is between our algorithm and the overlapping-sets version from , which is structurally closer to our algorithm than the even-split version. The runtime difference between these two versions is comparatively low.
Difference in the number of operations per iteration
The number of operations per iteration for the first algorithm is the sum of three steps: 1 reusing parts of information sets and performing precomputations 2 compute sums of p rows on l bits to calculateĤ 2 e T 3 for each collision (e 1 , e 2 ), checking if wt(s
To compare the cost of these steps with that used for our lower bound, we calculate all values for the (450, 225, 56) parameter set over F 1024 . For this set, using p = 1, l = 3, m = 1, c = 2 and r ′ = 1 (the last variable is called r in Peters (2010), but it should not be confused with the co-dimension), we calculate a total cost of the first algorithm of 2 76.9 , which consists of 2 56.1 iterations of 2 20.8 operations.
Precomputations. The cost of the first step is given in Peters (2010) as
where c and r ′ are algorithm parameters. For these parameters, this amounts to 2
20.1
operations, so it is the most expensive step. Our algorithm does not use precomputation, so we allocate no cost.
Computing sums of p rows to calculateĤ 2 e T . Cost of this step for the first algorithm:
The parameters N and N ′ are the sizes of the sets W 1 and W 2 . For the parameters given above, this step adds 2 19.4 operations. Our algorithm allocates to this step a cost of
We make this optimistic (from the cryptanalyst's point of view) assumption for the cost of a matrix-vector multiplication to anticipate further software and hardware improvements for this operation. The result is 2 4.9 operations in this case.
Checking collisions. The first algorithm allocates a cost of
to this step. For our set of parameters, this equals 2 11.4 operations. In our algorithm, we expect the number of collisions to be
The cost K q of checking each collision is taken to be K q = 2t. Since the expected number of collisions per iteration is very small, the expected cost per iteration is < 1. Some of the assumptions above may seem fairly optimistic. However, we find it necessary to make these assumptions since we want to establish conservative lower bounds.
Impact of partial knowledge on ISD
We analyse two specific types of partial knowledge in this section, namely 1 error values come from a subset E F q 2 the entries of e are known, but their positions are not.
There are various situations when adversaries have partial knowledge of these types. For example, the NTRU cryptosystem can be attacked by an ISD-like algorithm; although the cryptosystem is defined over F q (common values for q are 128 or 256), the random vector an attacker attempts to find is only ternary. Hence, an attacker knows that E = {1, −1} (since the error values are the non-zero entries) and can exploit this knowledge.
An example for the second type of partial knowledge is any Stern-like identification scheme that works over F q , provided the scheme does not use measures to prevent information leakage. For one of the challenges sent by the verifier, the prover sends a random permutation of the secret key in the answer phase. This reveals the value of all entries of the secret, but not their positions.
There are other types of partial knowledge, e.g. knowledge about the structure of the underlying code, or that a solution is a regular word (a regular word consists of t blocks of size n/t, and each block contains exactly one non-zero entry). Also, other attacks (e.g. Generalised Birthday algorithms) should be able to exploit partial knowledge. We leave these research questions for future work.
Error values come from a set E F q
If we know that the error values come from a set E F q , we can limit the size of the sets W i and L i by redefining:
∩ {e ∈ W k+l;⌈p/2⌉;q : le(e) = 1},
where E 0 = E ∪ 0. When restricting the leading entry of e to 1, the above assumes that 1 ∈ E. If this is not the case, i.e. 1 ∈ E, any other element in E can be used to fix the leading entry of all vectors in W 1 . This gives the following proposition: 
The case p = 0 is identical to the one in Proposition 1, hence
WF qISD (n, r, t, q) = .
Proof: See Appendix B. The difference to the proof of Proposition 1 is that we can decrease the size of the sets W ′ 1 and W 2 by allowing only error patterns with values in E 0 . The expected number of iterations is unchanged, but the number of operations per iteration decreases rapidly with E.
Error values known (but not error positions)
Let the error values be v 1 , . . . , v t . Depending on the size of the set V := {v 1 , . . . , v t }, several strategies can be used. We will describe three cases:
1 |V | = t, i.e., all error values are different 2 |V | < t, but there are still many different error values
|V | = t
In this case, we can decrease the number of error vectors we have to try in each iteration in the following way. For each distribution of p = p 1 + p 2 errors in k + l locations, we do not assign all combinations of q-ary values to the error positions, but instead randomly choose p out of the t known error values and assign them in all possible combinations. Hence, instead of
combinations, we only have to test
For most parameters, the second expression is much smaller than the first. For these parameters, we redefine the sets W i and L i as follows
where W ′ k+l;p;q is the set of all q-ary words of length k + l and weight distribution p 1 + p 2 , and those p values are taken from the known t error values. This gives the following result: 
An exception is p = 0, where the above method does not gain anything, hence
Proof: See Appendix C. Again, this type of partial knowledge allows to decrease the size of the sets W ′ 1 and W 2 . The method to construct these sets is different compared to the case above. Instead of restricting the allowed error values, we redefine the sets W ′ 1 and W 2 such that the entries have the correct weight and weight distribution, and in addition, the entries are chosen from v 1 to v t . This last condition is responsible for the additional binomial factors in the resulting formula of the lower bound.
Remark 6: By the pigeonhole principle, the condition |V | = t implies t < q (since v i = 0), so the above work factor is smaller than in the case without partial knowledge.
|V | < t, but still many different error values
This case enables further improvement compared to Section 4.2.1. Because of the condition |V | < t, some error values occur more than once. This further decreases the size of the W ′ sets, and hence W i and L i decrease in size.
For each of the k+l p patterns to distribute the errors, p values are chosen from V to be allocated to these error positions. If it happens that the same value is drawn more than once, then some permutations of these p error values lead to the same result, hence we can eliminate these.
The exact efficiency improvement depends not only on |V | but on the detailed distribution of errors (e.g. three times the same error value is not the same as two pairs of the same value each). Let D i , i ∈ N, describe the distributions of error values that can occur after applying the random permutation, i.e. the number of pairs, triplets etc. Let P (D i ) be the probability that such a distribution occurs, and G(D i ) be the efficiency gain in such a case (with 0 < G(D i ) ≤ 1). Then the total work factor is decreased by a factor of
As an example, consider a case where t = 20, p = 6, |V | = 10, and v i = ⌈i/2⌉; that is, all error values come in pairs. We can describe each distribution by the number j of error value pairs amongst the p last error positions, where collisions are searched for. Each pair decreases the number of operations by a factor of 2. The probability of the event is
Hence, the number of operations performed by the algorithm is reduced to
In this example, we do not have a huge efficiency improvement, but for smaller V (and hence more pairs, triplets etc. of error values), the chance of a gain as well as the gain itself increases.
In order to analyse the situation in more detail, we introduce some notation: Let v = |V | denotes the size of V ; each of these v values occurs at u 1 , . . . , u v positions, and a configuration (c 1 , . . . , c v ) with i c i = p denotes how many of these values are chosen for the last p error positions. Then the probability of a certain configuration c = (c 1 , . . . , c v ) is
while the gain is
An interesting general case is u 1 = . . . = u v = t/v. Since p is usually small for ISD attacks, we do not expect a large efficiency gain if v is large as well. However, for small values of v, the gain increases significantly. See Table 3 for details. Table 3 Expected efficiency gain for t = 12 and various values of p and v. Shown is the fraction of required operations between the improved and the standard algorithms Remark 7: Note that higher values of p allow for greater efficiency improvements. In fact, the example in Section 4.3 shows that the optimal value for p is significantly higher compared with the case without partial knowledge. This has to be taken into account when selecting attack parameters for the ISD algorithm.
Small V and most error values belonging to a small subset of V
If most error values come from a smaller subset V s ⊂ V , we can modify the algorithm to take advantage of this fact. Instead of considering the full set V when defining sets L i and searching for collisions, we can simply assume that the random permutation moved all errors with values not belonging to V s to the left-hand side of the matrix. The sets L i are then defined using the smaller set V s , decreasing their size and thereby increasing the algorithm's efficiency. While this assumption decreases the probability of finding a suitable permutation, it is more than offset by the reduced number of operations per iteration.
Example 1: the CVE ID scheme
In Cayrel, Véron and El Yousfi Alaoui (2010) , the authors propose a zero-knowledge identification scheme called CVE based on the q-ary syndrome decoding problem. In the scheme, they propose to use a special permutation of the secret value s in order to hide the non-zero values of s. In this section, we recall the CVE scheme and study the effect of a leakage of the values of s on the ISD algorithm. In what follows, we write elements of F n q as n blocks of size ⌈log 2 (q)⌉ = N . We represent each element of F q on N bits. We first introduce the special permutation that is used in the protocol to hide the non-zero values.
Definition 5: Let Σ be a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) ∈ F n q such that ∀i, γ i = 0. We define the transformation Π γ,Σ as :
Notice that ∀α ∈ F q , ∀v ∈ F n q , it holds that Π γ,Σ (αv) = αΠ γ,Σ (v), and wt(Π γ,Σ (v)) = wt(v).
The CVE identification scheme consists of two parts: a key generation algorithm ( Figure 1 ) and an identification protocol (Figure 2 ). Key generation. For r := n − k, the scheme uses a random (r × n) q-ary matrix H common to all users which corresponds to a parity check matrix of a random linear [n, k] q-ary code. We can assume that H is described as (I r |R) where R is a random r × k matrix; as Gaussian elimination does not change the code generated by H, there is no loss of generality. Let κ be the security parameter. Figure 1 describes the key generation process.
Identification protocol. The secret key holder can prove his knowledge of e by using two blending factors: the transformation by means of a permutation and a random vector. The protocol has to be run several times to detect cheating provers. The security of the construction relies on the hardness of the general decoding problem, that is, on the difficulty of determining the preimage (with respect to left-hand multiplication by H) e of s T = He T . In Figure 2 , h denotes a hash function and S n the symmetric group of degree n.
Attack scenario
In this section, we show how an ISD attacker against the security of the CVE can gain partial knowledge on the secret. We analyse the CVE scheme and show that the prover leaks information to a potential attacker when using a 'classic' permutation instead of the function Π γ,Σ .
We assume that attacker Eve attempts to impersonate the honest prover Alice. She can do this by recovering Alice's secret e; when Eve later runs the ID scheme with the honest verifier Bob, this allows her to successfully answer all queries.
First, Eve runs the ID scheme with Alice, where Eve sends the challenge b = 1. If the CVE scheme does not use the function Π γ,Σ to prevent information leakage, but rather sends the permuted secret, Eve will gain partial knowledge on the secret e.
Similarly to the original Stern scheme, Eve then attempts to find a code word w, minimising the weight of (v + w) where v ∈ H −1 (s) and s is Alice's public key. If she is successful, Eve can use s ′ := v + w and randomly chosen u, γ and σ to successfully answer all queries by the verifier Bob. An element w with the above properties can be found using ISD-like algorithms. Table 4 shows how much our modification of ISD attacks decreases the security of the CVE scheme (without the special permutation). 
Example 2: NTRU scheme
The first version of the NTRUEncrypt Public Key Cryptosystem, which was simply called NTRU, was developed around 1996 by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman (1998) . NTRU is characterised by the three integers (N, p, q) such that:
• N is a prime number
• p a small integer
• q a large integer (often much larger than p), coprime with p
• d f and d g two positive integers.
In order to transfer the NTRU problem to a code-based problem over F q , we require that q is a prime power. Bob's private key consists of two polynomials f =
The public key h is a polynomial of degree N − 1 such that f * h = pg mod q, where * is the cyclic convolution.
Additionally, there are restrictions on f and g:
• f has d f coefficients equal to 1, d f − 1 coefficients equal to −1, and the remaining N − (2d f − 1) equal to 0.
• g has d g coefficients equal to 1, d g coefficients equal to −1, and the remaining N − 2d g equal to 0.
Attack of NTRU using ISD
We can translate the problem of finding the secret key h in the polynomial ring R to the problem of finding a vector in F q . The equation above thus becomes
where (G|F ) represents the concatenation of G = (g 0 , . . . , g N −1 ) and F = (f 0 , . . . , f N −1 ), and H is the matrix of size N × 2N :
H is public while F and G are private. We know that F has (2 × d f − 1) non-zero coefficients and G has 2 × d g non-zero coefficients. The non-zero coefficients of F and G constitute the private key. This is the same situation as we have for many code-based schemes and we can directly apply ISD-based algorithms to find a set of (2d g + 2d f − 1) columns of H whose weighted sum equals zero. In addition to that, however, we also know that the coefficients in this weighted sum are in {+1, −1}, so we do not have to search through the entire F q .
To our best knowledge, this is the first attack to use ISD and partial knowledge for cryptanalysing the NTRU scheme. The complexity of the attack here is larger than that of the best known attack against NTRU. However, we make the following point: partial knowledge does, in fact, reduce general running time for cryptanalytic algorithms, and it should thus be taken into consideration when designing cryptographic schemes.
Conclusion and outlook
Attacks based on ISD are amongst the most efficient generic attacks against codebased cryptosystems. In this paper, we have presented and proved lower bounds for ISD algorithms over F q . Part of the result is a modification of the algorithms from Finiasz and Sendrier (2009) which allows to increase the efficiency of the algorithm by a factor √ q − 1 compared to a straightforward q-ary generalisation of Finiasz and Sendrier (2009) .
In addition, we described various situations where an attacker can obtain partial knowledge about the secret and we proposed two techniques to exploit this knowledge. These techniques were analysed and we proved new lower bounds for the complexity of the modified algorithms.
As an example, we show how to apply partial knowledge to attack the CVE identification scheme if information leakage is not prevented. The complexity of the attack is decreased significantly, even though we computed conservatively (e.g. we assumed all error values to be different). Clearly, the potential leakage of partial knowledge has to be analysed when designing new cryptosystems.
It is seen from Table 1 that the efficiency of concrete algorithms over F 2 is not far from the lower bound, while over larger fields the gap is wider. We propose to further investigate improvements over F q to decrease the size of this gap.
As future research, we suggest to analyse the impact of partial knowledge on other attacks, for example on Generalised Birthday algorithms. In addition to that, other types of partial knowledge should be considered. For example, in the FSB hash function Augot, Finiasz and Sendrier (2005) , the 'message' is transformed into a regular word, which means that each block of size n/t has weight 1. It should be analysed how this knowledge can increase the efficiency of attacks in order to better estimate the security of cryptographic schemes.
where W k+l;p;q is the set of all q-ary words of length k + l and weight p. (4)-(6). First note that for any pair (e 1 , e 2 ) and all non-zero values y ∈ F q , we havê , however, would contain every entry exactly (q − 1) times, since for every y ∈ F q \{0}, e 1 and ye 1 yield the same entry. Therefore, we can generate the first list by using only vectors e 1 whose first non-zero entry is 1.
To see that there is exactly one collision between L ′ 1 and L ′ 2 for every solution of the problem, let (e 1 , e 2 ) be a pair found by our algorithm. Let y = le(Ĥ 2 e and therefore (e 1 zy −1 , e 2 ) is a solution to the problem. Conversely, let (e 1 , e 2 ) be a solution to the problem, i.e.,Ĥ 2 e 
As we did not limit the set W 2 , the right-hand side of Eq. (15) is an element of L ′ 2 . Let x = le(e 1 ). The first non-zero entry of e ′ 1 = e 1 x −1 is 1, so it was used to calculate one member of L Obviously, this improvement can only be applied if p > 0, i.e., if there actually is a search for collisions. If p = 0, we are simply trying to find a permutation which shifts all error positions into the first r positions of s, so the runtime is the inverse of the probability P 0 of this event with P 0 = r t / n t . For the rest of the appendix, we assume p > 0.
A.2 Cost of the algorithm
In most cases, the value of t will be smaller than the GV bound, and we expect the algorithm to require many iterations. In that case, in one iteration of our main loop, we expect to test a fraction Minimising over p and l yields the lower bound result:
WF qISD (n, r, t, q) ≈ 2lq r/2 r−l t−p |E| t−p+1
